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P RELDUNARY HEMORANDUM
September 30, 1985 Conference
Summer List 1, Sheet 3
No. 84-1839
SCHIAVONE (alleged briber)

e+ J4/ .

Cert. to CA3 (Seitz,
Becker, Rosenn)

v.
FORTUNE, a.k.a. TIME, INC.

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petrs argue that Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure lS(c) should be interpreted to allow their
amended complaint to relate back to the filing date of their
original complaint so that their action will not be barred by the

--------~---~----~----~~-- ~ ~

applicable statute of limitations.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELON:

Petrs alleged that

they were libeled in a · Fortune Magazine cover story entitled

..

"The Charges Against Reagan's Labor Secretary," which appeared
in the May 31, 1982 issue.

They filed complaints against

"Fortune" on May 9, 1983.
on May 19, 1983.

The statute of limitations ran

Petitioners served "Fortune" by mailing

the complaints on May 20, 1983 to the New Jersey registered
agent for Time, Inc.

"Fortune" is a trademark and an internal

division of Time, Inc., but has no separate legal identity.
Time, Inc. received the complaints on May 23, 1983 but refused
to accept service because the party named was not "Time, Inc."
On July 19, 1983, petrs amended the complaints to name the
defendant as "Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated."
The amended : complaints were served on July 21, 1983.
The District Court granted Time's motion to dismiss
based on the statute of limitations defense.

It held that

the amended complaints did not relate back to the original
filing date because Time had not received notice of the action
before the statute ran as required by rule lS(c). · Rule lS(c) allows
an amendment ·changing the party to relate back to the original
filing date if "the claim .

.

. ·asserted in the amended pleading

arose out of the • . . transaction • • . set forth .
original pleading [and]

.

.

. • in the

. the party to be brought in by

amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of
the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his
defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that,
but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party,
the action would have been brought against him."

Fed. R. Civ.

P. lS(c).
CA3 affirmed.

It rejected petrs' argument that

the amendment correcting the misnomer should not be considered
a change of party for purposes of rule 15(c) because there was
an identity of interest between the intended defendant and the
defendant named in the original complaint.

The court reasoned

that "[t]here is no support in the rule or the advisory
committee note for plaintiffs' proffered exception."

The

court then refused to rule that the amended complaint related
back.

It observed that there is a split in the circuits

concerning the proper interpretation of rule 15(c).

The

Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have literally applied
rule 15(c) 's strict notice requirement.

Cooper v. Postal

Service, 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984): Watson v. Unipress,
Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (lOth Cir. 1984): Hughes v. United
States, 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1983).

See also Trace X

Chemical, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chemical Co., 724 ·F.2d 68, 70-71
(8th Cir. 1983).

The Second and Fifth Circuits have determined

that the rule cannot be read literally to require notice to the
substitute party within the statutory limitations period.
Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980); Ingram
v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 940 (1979).

See also Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co.,

692 F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982) (Jones, J., concurring).
Though noting the appeal of the Second and Fifth Circuit's
position "as a policy matter," the CA3 adopted the literal
position because the language of rule 15(c) is "clear and
unequivocal" and because "it is not this court's role to amend
procedural rules in accordance with our own policy preferences."

3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs argue that the Court should

resolve the intercircuit conflict by adopting the nonliteral
interpretation of rule 15(c).

They would extend the notice

period by the reasonable time allowed under the federal rules
for service of process.
Petrs also argue that an amendment changing parties
should always relate back when there is an "identity of interests"
between the misnamed and the correct party.
4.
c~

DISCUSSION:

There is clearly an intercircuit
~

on the proper interpretation of rule 15(c).

But,

in my opinion, the side on which the CA3 carne down has the
better of the argument.

There are certainly reasons favoring

either formulation of the rule, but the CA3's interpretation
is strongly supported b y the plain and unequivocal language of
rule 15(c).

Moreover, the trend seems to be in favor of the

CA3's position and away from the original CA2 position.

The

conflict is also not such a serious one that this Court must
resolve it.

There is no basis in the rule or advisory notes

for petrs' "identity of interests" exception to the ordinary
rule that corrected misnomers are party changes within the
meaning of rule 15(c).
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There is a response and a reply.
July 18, 1985
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

February 7, 1986

From: Bob
No. 84-1839

RONALD A SCHIAVONE, et al. v. FORTUNE aka TIME, INC.

Cert to CA3, set for argument Wednesday, February
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether

an

amendment

-

~6,

1986

to correct misnomer of the defendant

relates back under Rule 15(c), where the defendant to be brought
in was notified of the action four days after the statute of lim-

-

~

i tat ions had expired,

-

...

-::::::=-

by timely service upon it of the process

------------~

issued in the name used for the defendant in the complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Petrs alleged that they were libeled in a cover story entitled

"The

Charges Against

Reagan's

Labor

Secretary"

peared in the May 31, 1982 issue of Fortune Magazine.

which

ap-

Complaints

page 2. ~

against "Fortune" were

~d

,tJ~~

by the petrs on May 9,

1983 ~ Sub- ~
~

stantial distribution of that issue of Fortune was held to have
occurred on May 19, 1982 at the latest.
of limitations
the

latest.

the

party

for

libel

On May 20,

named

was

not

-------

(one year)

The New Jersey statute ~

expired on May 19,

-------------~--~---

1983 petrs served "Fortune" by mailing

"Time,

Inc."

On July

amended the complaints to name the defendant as
known as Time, Incorporated."

19,

1983

petrs

"Fortune,

also

The amended complaints were served

by certified mail on July 21, 1983.
Time's motion to dismiss,

1983 ~

based upon

~

The District Court granted
_
t ~ statu~ f

J

i mJ; tations

---------~

defense and held that the amended complaints did not relate back

~

~

to the original filing date because Time had received notice of ~#"U....6
the institution of the action after May 19, 1983, the date of the
running

of

the

statute

of

limitations.

The Third Circuit

firmed.
II. DISCUSSION
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original ple a~1ng.- ~n amendment changing the par~ ins f whom a claim is asserted ~ ates
back i_~he foregoing provision is satisfied an~ ith
in the- period provided by law for commencing the action
"@ inst him, the party to ~~ brought in by amendment
has rece•ived uch 11 notice of the institution of the
action t
e
i
no
e
re 'udiced in maintaining
his defense on the mer1ts, and (
ew or should have

r

'·

r

af-

~k_
~ .

(-

page 3.

known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity
of the proper party, the action would have been brought
against him.
The advisory committee note makes clear that "Rule 15(c)

is

amplified to state more clearly when an amendment of a pleading
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted (including an
amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant)
shall 'relate back' to the date of the original pleading."
it

is clear

that petrs'

mistaken naming of Time,

Inc.,

Thus,
as For-

---------~---------~~c,•c-~--~----~----~
-=-c~~------·~
----~

tune, brings the later amendment within Rule 15(c).
~

Petrs'

c:::

5

::S..

?Qa -::a&

e

~A

c:;l'

'--"""'

task is to persuade this Court that the literal lan-

guage of the rule should be ignored.
commend petrs'

Although there is much to

view that the rule should permit relation back in

a situation such as that in the case at bar, I do not believe any
of

their

arguments

are

so

strong

that

this Court should stray

\

from the plain language of the rule.
Petrs argue that the phrase "within the period provided by
law for

commencing the action" should be read to include a rea-

~~----------------~
sonable
time for service ~of
statute of limitations.

process

after

the

The thrust of petrs'

running
argument

of
is

the
that

because service to a correctly named defendant is permissible in
the first instance after the statute of limitations has run, such
notice

should

also

named a defendant.
ing

be

allowed

to

a

party who

has

incorrectly

Petrs first argue that the history surround-

the 1966 amendment

relevant to this case,

to rule 15 (c), which added the language
supports their argument,

but I disagree.

All parties agree that the impetus for the 1966 amendment to rule \
lS(c)

came from an article in Harvard Law Review by Clark Byse.

page 4.

That article recounted the tale of four district court cases in
which citizens were attempting to sue the government.
case, the plaintiff named the wrong government officer.

In each
In one

case, for example, the plaintiff named a Secretary of HEW who had
been replaced just nineteen days prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

By the time the plaintiff had amended his complaint, the

statute of limitations had run.

In such a case the court did not

permit the bringing of this "new" action beyond the limitations
period.

In disagreeing with the results in these cases, and in

proposing a solution, Professor Byse noted:
"The objective of the sixty-day [statute of limitations] is to require the disappointed [social security] claimant to give timely notice to a government official or agency of the Government that the claimant is
seeking judicial reversal of the denial of his application for benefits under the Social Security Act.
If
this objective would not be frustrated or impeded by
permitting a plaintiff to amend his pleadings to bring
in the proper defendant, it is difficult to see why the
amendment should not be permitted."

~se,

S u i n g the

" Wrong " "_::.D..:::e..::f-=e;.;:.n.:...;d~a::..;n=t__;l::..:.n:..::.__...:J....:u::..d=.i.=;c.:;i..:::a:.::;l;__.::...R-=e-=v-=i:...:e=..;w~.....:o~f

Federal Administrative Action:
Rev •

40 ,

46

( 19 6 3 ) .
the

Proposals for Reform, 77 Harv. L.

Thus, Professor Byse was concerned about
applicable

limitations

period,

and

whether

there in fact had been proper notice in the District Court cases
he was discussing.

His article is simply not helpful in assess-

------ing the narrow issuer

before the Court in this case, which is

whether notice given after the statute of limitations period has
run should suffice for purposes of Rule 15 (c)
language to the contrary in the rule itself.
district court cases

in light of plain
Similarly, the four

about which Professor Byse spoke did not

page 5.

address the issue--and their holdings and the criticism they provoked do not address the narrow issue before the court.
tion, contrary to petrs'
endorsed petrs'

view.

claim~Professor

In addi-

Kaplan never explicitly

The only conclusion to be drawn from the

historical argument is that no one expressly considered the precise

issue before the Court

argument,
here,

in this case.

Petrs'

"historical"

in sum, is nothing but a restatement of their argument

that it would be logical to allow relation back where the
the federal

party has notice within the time
rules even though the statute of limitations has run.
That argument has some logical appeal.

--

-

--

If the federal rules

permit actual notice of an action after the statute of limi tations has begun, what difference does it make that the action in
one case was filed against a correctly named defendant within the
statute of limitations period, and in the other case it was not.
The theoretical answer
limitations

period,

a

is that by filing within the statute of
properly named defendant

is

put

on con-

structive notice of the claim against him, whereas when there is
an improperly named defendant there is neither constructive nor
actual notice of the suit within the limitations period.
theoretical explanation may not convince me,
rule from scratch,

were I

This

drafting a

that actual notice to the misnamed defendant

must take place within the limitations period, but in the face of
the rule's clearly drafted provision, I do not think that petitioner's argument should call for deviation from the language of
the rule.

page 6.

Petrs then ask the Court to draw an exception simply in situations in which there is an "identity of interest" between the
party named and the intended party as in this case.

Petrs argue

that even if the rule is construed in the case of suit against a
wrong defendant to require actual notice within the limitations
period, such a view makes no sense in the misnomer context as it
exists here because the party petitioner intended to sue got the
identical notice it would have had it been correctly named originally.

First,

it

is not clear to me what logical basis exists

for carving out this particular exception.

Second, petrs attempt

to draw support for their identity of interest exception by saying that prior

the 1966 amendment

to rule 15(c), relation back

was allowed so long as the party who shared the identity of interest was on notice.

Once again,

petrs extrapolate and claim

that because notice would in some situations been allowed after
the expiration of

the statute of limitations,

relation back

in

all likelihood was allowed when notice came after the statute of
limitations
curred;

had

passed.

Petrs

cite

no case

in which

this oc-

indeed, given that the language relative to the statute

of limitations is found for the first time in the rule, it would
be surprising to find the issue discussed in any such case.

Fi-

nally,

it is not at all clear that any pre-amendment case would

be

all persuasive

at

as

against

rule is clear on its face.

the

argument

that

the amended

To be sure, the "identity of inter-

est" theory may have some vitality in a case such as the present
where service on Time, Inc. of a complaint naming Fortune is de-

page 7.

livered prior to the running of the statute of limitations, but
that is not this case.
On a more theoretical plain, one may argue, as petrs'

seem

to on p. 16, that filing of a complaint naming Fortune, put Time,
Inc. on constructive notice within the limitations period.
a

reading of the notice

Such

requirement would obviate the need for

rule 15(c) in misnomer cases, because all actions must begin with
a timely filed complaint,
would fictionalize
be

contemplated

by

in filing states. Second, such a view

the notice concept, which does not appear to
the

rule.

See Note,

Federal

Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 83
(1972).
Finally, petrs contend that the court should decide the case
in the spirit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 which declares that the rules
"shall be construed

to secure the

determination of every action."
in the above is "construed."

I

just,

speedy and

inexpensive

think that the important word

If the Court were able to rewrite

rules under the guise of "construing" them, in cases such as this
when the language could not be clearer, then it is inviting lower
courts to do the same.
I am also not convinced that an affirmance should be criticized

as

injustice

blind
that

adherence
results

to

literalism.

in a case such as

-------------------~

There

is

no manifest

this when a plaintiff

~~-----

fails to determine the proper party to be sued, and waits for the ~
last possible minute

to sue.

In addition,

I

am not convinced

that a holding in favor of petrs might not open up other cans of
worms so as to transform rule 15 from a relatively straightfor-

page 8.

ward device for dealing with the relation back of amendments into
a fertile ground for
tion

based

solely

further

on

the

litigation.

"identity of

For example, an excepinterest"

principle may

create an incentive for parties to squabble over the contours of
that doctrine.
ent,

Further,

although this is not argued by respond-

I am concerned that a holding that notice within the period

prescribed by law plus a

reasonable

time for service under the

federal rules, might spawn additional litigation in states where
the action is deemed commenced by the service of process, because
there would then be confusion whether a holding based on the federal

rules 1

view

that

actual

statute of limitations has

notice

can

take

place

after

the

run should permit relation back even

in a service state when there is no notice until a period of time
after

the

running of

the statute of limitations.

Upon further

reflection these last two concerns may not turn about to be all
that

substantial;

changes

yet,

just

raising

in rules should take place

them

supports

a

view

that

in the rule writing process

where the ramifications of such changes can be carefully considered and commented upon,
"construing" a rule.

and not by a court under the guise of

I am sympathetic to petrs 1 admonition that

the Rules of Civil Procedure favor resolution of disputes on the
merits.

I

do not,

however, think that that principle should be

carried so far as to rewrite perfectly clear rules.
Finally,

it

is worth noting

many courts of appeals have
two

~

(CA2, 5)

respondent,

respondent points out

read rule 15 (c)

have adopted petrs

I

that as

1

1 iter ally,

wh~eas

-----------------From the cases cited
view.

count at least five circuits
~

by

(CA 3,4,7,9,10), in-

r~f

page 9.

eluding the case at bar, that have rejected a request not to read
the rule literally with respect to notice within the statute of
limitations period. In fairness to petrs it should be pointed out
for purposes of accuracy that in none of the circuit court cases
cited by respondent on pp.
directly confront

and

29 and 30 of its brief, did a court

reject

the narrow "identity of

interest"

exception suggested by petrs here. Indeed, those cases generally
did not involve "misnomer" cases such as the case at bar, wherein
the proper party was served with a pleading containing the wrong
name.

Only the CAS case, Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404

bears a resemblance to the facts here.
spondent,

for

example,

have

involved

(1980),

Four cases cited by resuits

against

government

agencies, wherein a party then seeks to add an additional officer, agency, or the United States itself.
84-6582, slip op.
F.2d 714
States,

(CA4 1985); Cooper v.

(CA9 1984), cert. denied, ___
701 F.2d

F.2d 741

56

(CA7

1982);

Weisgal v. Smith, No.

u.s.

Postal Service, 740

u.s. ___ ;

Stewart v.

Hughes v. United

United States,

655

(CA 7 1981). Another has involved the use of John Doe

defendants,
Unipress,

with

Inc.,

Duffy's Inc.,
rule 15(c)

replacement
733 F.2d

471 F.2d

later

on

(CA 10 1984).
33

(lOth Cir.

by

amendment.

Watson

v.

Indeed, in Archuelata v.
1973),

the court applied

in a straightforward literal manner, and in declining

to find a mere misnomer in the case before it, because a totally
separate

corporate

entity

"allow misnomers

to

course."

35.

Id.,

at

be

had

been sued,

amended and relate
It is not clear

noted

that

it would

back as a matter of

exactly what this would

mean in the context of the case at bar, but it suggests

the~-

page 10.

sibility that courts might look differently on such a case, although I stick to my conclusion that they should not do so, especially in light of the fact that the Advisory Committee Note expressly includes

"misnomers"

within the concept of a change of

party.
III. CONCLUSION
A case like this in the end is probably a judgment call.
course,

this

suggested

by

Court
petrs.

could
I

incorporate
am

persuaded,

change should come in the rule writing

into the
however,

rule
that

the

Of

change

any

process.~ecommend

sue~

that

for the
Third Circuit and apply the rule to this case as it is written.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1839
RONALD A. SCHIAVONE, GENARO LIQUORI AND
JOSEPH A. DICAROLIS, PETITIONER v. FORTUNE, AKA TIME, INCORPORATED
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[April - , 1986]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case primarily concerns Rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and its application to a less-thanprecise denomination of a defendant in complaints filed in federal court near the expiration of the period of limitations.
Because of an apparent conflict among the Courts of Appeals,1 we granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1985).

I
The three petitioners instituted this diversity litigation on
May 9, 1983, by filing their respective complaints in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
Each complaint alleged that the plaintiff was libeled in a
cover story entitled "The Charges Against Reagan's Labor
Secretary," which appeared in the May 31, 1982, issue of Fortune magazine. The caption of each complaint named "For'Compare, e. g., Cooper v. U. S. Postal Service, 740 F. 2d 714, 716
(CA91984), cert. denied,- U. S . - (1985); Watson v. Unipress, Inc. ,
733 F. 2d 1386, 1390 (CAlO 1984); Hughes v. United States, 701 F. 2d 56,
58 (CA7 1982); and Trace X Chemical, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chemical Co., 724
F. 2d 68, 70-71 (CA81983), with Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F. 2d 404, 408 (CA5
1980); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F. 2d 566, 571-572 (CA2 1978), cert. denied,
440 U. S. 940 (1979); and R ingrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F. 2d 403,
410 (CA6 1982) (concurring opinion).

84-1839--0PINION
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SCHIAVONE v. FORTUNE

tune," without embellishment, as the defendant. See App.
8. In its paragraph 2, each complaint described Fortune as
"a foreign corporation having its principal offices at Time and
Life Building, Sixth Avenue and 50th Street, New York,
New York 10020." ld., at 9. "Fortune," however, is only a
trademark and the name of an internal division of Time, Incorporated (Time), a New York corporation. 2
On May 20, petitioners' counsel mailed the complaints to
Time's registered agent in New Jersey. They were received
by the agent on May 23. The agent refused service because
Time was not named as a defendant.
On July 19, 1983, each petitioner amended his complaint to
name as the captioned defendant "Fortune, also known as
Time, Incorporated," and, in the body of the complaint, torefer to "Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated," as a
New York corporation with a specified registered New J ersey agent. See App. 25, 26. The amended complaints were
served on Time by certified mail on July 21.
Time moved to dismiss the amended complaints. The District Court granted those motions. ld., at 96, 98, 100. It
ruled that the complaints, as amended, adequately named
Time as a defendant, and therefore were not to be dismissed
"for failure of capacity of defendant to be sued." Supp. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 18. Under New Jersey law, however, see
N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-3 (West 1952), a libel action must be
commenced within one year of the publication of the alleged
libel. 3 Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 18. State law also provides that the "'date upon which a substantial distribution occurs triggers the statute of limitations for any and all actions
arising out of that publication," id., at 19, quoting MacDonald v. Time, Inc., Civil No. 81-479 (DNJ Aug. 25, 1981).
2
No claim is made that Fortune is a separate legal entity with the capacity to be sued.
3
The cited New Jersey statute reads:
"Every action at law for libel or slander shall be commenced within 1
year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander. "
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Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19. 4 The court found it unnecessary, for purposes of the motion, to determine the precise
date the statute of limitations had begun to run.
Although Time acknowledged that the original filings were
within the limitations period, it took the position that it could
not be named as a party after the period had expired. Time
contended that a party must be substituted within the limitations period in order for the amendment to relate back to the
original filing date pursuant to Rule 15(c). 5
The District Court concluded that the amendments to the
complaints did not relate back to the filing of the original
complaints because it had not been shown that Time received
notice of the institution of the suits within the period provided by law for commencing an action against it. Supp.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 23. It therefore "with great reluctance" granted the motion to dismiss, noting that any dismissal of a claim based upon the statute of limitations "by its
very nature is arbitrary." /d., at 24. The court also ruled
that the "equities of this situation" did not demand that relief
4
The court noted that, despite the magazine's cover date of May 31,
1982, the record "indicate[d)" that, for purposes of determining the limitations period, publication "occurred substantially before" May 31; that subscription copies were mailed May 12 and received by subscribers May
13-19; that newsstand copies went on sale May 17; that a press release was
issued May 11; and that copies of the magazine were mailed to representatives of the press on that date. Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19.
5
Rule 15(c) provides in pertinent part:
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom
a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and ,
within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him,
the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his
defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against him."
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be afforded to petitioners. Ibid. The identity of the publisher of Fortune was readily ascertainable from the magazine itself. It rejected petitioners' contention that Time deliberately misled them to believe that Fortune was a separate
corporation. It observed that petitioners created the risk by
filing their suits close to the end of the limitations period.
Id., at 25.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. By letter opinion
filed January 12, 1984, the court adhered to its prior ruling.
App. to Brief in Opposition 1.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, the three actions were consolidated. That
court affirmed the orders of the District Court. 750 F. 2d 15
(1984). It ruled that the New Jersey statute of limitations
ran "on May 19, 1983, at the latest," for a "substantial distribution" of the issue of May 31, 1982, had "occurred on May
19, 1982, at the latest." Id., at 16. It regarded the language of Rule 15(c) as "clear and unequivocal." 750 F. 2d, at
18. It also said: "While we are sympathetic to plaintiffs' arguments, we agree with the defendant that it is not this
court's role to amend procedural rules in accordance with our
own policy preferences." Ibid. It further held that the period within which the defendant to be brought in must receive notice under Rule 15(c) does not include the time available for service of process.
II
It is clear, from what has been noted above, that the three
complaints as originally drawn were filed within the limitations period; that service was attempted only after that period had expired; and that the amendment of the complaints,
and the service of the complaints as so amended, also necessarily took place after the expiration of the limitations period.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals so found, and we
have no reason to disagree. The parties themselves do not
Instead, their dispute centers on
dispute these facts.

..
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whether Time was sufficiently named as the defendant in the
original complaints so that the service that was attempted
after the 1-year period but within the time allowed for service after the complaints' filing was effective, and on whether,
in any event, the amendment of the complaints related back
to the original filing and accomplished the same result.
Petitioners argue that Rule 15(c)'s present form came into
being by amendment in 1966 for the express purpose of allowing :relation back of a change in the name or identity of a defendant when, although the limitations period for filing had
run, the period allowed by Rule 4 for timely service had not
yet expired. Brief for Petitioners 5. The Rule was
effected, it is said, to ameliorate literal and rigid application
of limitations periods to both claim and party amendments.
It is urged that the Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied and construed to yield just determinations, that is,
determinations on the merits, and that a procedural "double
standard" that bars relation back for late notice to a new defendant when a like notice to the original defendant would be
timely is unacceptable. Petitioners further argue that the
original party named here and the party sought to be substituted had such commonality of interest that notice to one was
in fact notice to the other. Therefore, it is said, where the
intended defendant was misdesignated in form only, and
knew or reasonably should have known that it was the true
target and received the same notice it would have received
had the form been flawless, "relation back should be a foregone conclusion." Brief for Petitioners 6.
Respondent, of course, takes issue with this approach. It
claims that the language of Rule 15(c) is clear and that proper
notice of the institution of these actions was not received by it
within the period of limitations. It asserts that the equities
do not support petitioners' position, and that the interpretation of Rule 15(c) urged by petitioners in effect would be an
impermissible rewriting of the Rule by this Court.

.

...
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III
As amended, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "These rules . . . shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Rule 8(f) says: "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice." And Justice Black reminded us, more
than 30 years ago, in connection with an order adopting revised rules of this Court, that the "principal function of procedural rules should be to serve as useful guides to help, not
hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their problems before the courts." 346 U. S. 945, 946 (1954).
This Court, too, in the early days of the federal civil procedure rules, when Rule 15(c), seen. 5, supra, consisted only of
what is now its first sentence, announced that the spirit and
inclination of the rules favored decisions on the merits, and
rejected an approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep may be decisive. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S.
41, 48 (1957). It also said that decisions on the merits are
not to be avoided on the basis of "mere technicalities."
Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962).
Despite these worthy goals and loftily stated purposes, we
conclude that the judgments of the Court of Appeals in the
present cases were correct.
A

The defendant named in the caption of each of the original
complaints was "Fortune," and Fortune was described in the
body of the complaint as "a foreign corru.v;ation" having principal offices in the Time and Life Building in New York City.
It also was alleged that Fortune was engage in e publication of a magazine of that name. Attached to the complaint
were a copy of the magazine's cover for its issue of May 31,
1982, an artist's depiction of an alleged payoff, and the text of
parts of the article about which petitioners complained. The
focus, as pleaded, was on Fortune.
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We cannot understand why, in litigation of this asserted
magnitude, Time was Mtiramed specifically as the defendant
in the caption and in the bod of each com lamt. T is was
not a situation where the ascertainment of the defendant's
identity was difficult for the plaintiffs. An examination of ( t-b
the magazine's masthead clearly would have revealed the cor£--6
porate entity responsible for the publication.
Petitioners nonetheless rely on Fortune's status as a division of Time to argue that institution of an action purportedly
against the former constituted notice of the action to the latter, as a related entity. Some Courts of Appeals have recognized an "identity-of-interest" exce tion under which an
amen ment t at substitutes a party in a complaint after the
limitations period has expired will relate back to the date of
the filing of the original complaint. 7 The Court of Appeals in
this case re ·e ed that a roach. The object of the exception is to avoid t e application of the statute of limitations

r

The magazine's ve ~tion, that of May 31, 1982, p. 2,
recites:
"FORTUNE (ISSN 0015-8259), May 31, 1982, Vol. 105, No. 11. Issued
biw~ !!!,c., 3435 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Cal. 9001~..
Principal ofnces:""'Time & Life Building, Rockefeller Center, New York,
N. Y. 10020. . . .
FORTUNE is a registered mar of Time
Incorporated."
The parailel information set forth in current issues of Fortune magazine
reads:
"FORTUNE (ISSN 0015-8259). Published biweekly, with three issues in
October, by Time Inc., 10880 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA
90024-4193. Time Inc. principal office: Time & Life Building, Rockefeller
Center, New York, NY 10020-1393. . . . FORTUNE is a registered
mark of Time Inc."
See issue of Apr. 16, 1986, p. 4; issue of Mar. 31, 1986, p. 4; issue of Mar.
17, 1986, p. 4.
7
See, e. g., Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States, ex rel. Construction Specialties Co., 382 F. 2d 103 (CAlO 1967); Montalvo v. Tower Life
Building, 426 F. 2d 1135 (CA5 1970); Korn v. Royal Carribean Cruise
Line, Inc., 724 F. 2d 1397 (CA9 1984).
6
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when no prejudice would result to the party sought to be
added.
Even if we were to adopt the identity-of-interest exception, and even if Fortune properly could be named as a defendant, we would be compelled to re ·ect eti ·oners' ontention that the facts of this case fall within the exception.
Timely filmg ofaco-mpfamt, andwtice within the limitations
period to the party named in the complaint, permits imputation of notice to a subsequently named and sufficiently related party. In this case, however, neither Fortune nor {
Time received notice of the filin until a er
e ·od of limitations ad run.
hus, there was no proper notice to Fortun~ be imputed to Time. See Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F. 2d 99, 102-103 (CAl 1979);
Norton v. International Harvester Co., 627 F. 2d 18, 20-21
(CA7 1980).
The demands of orderly federal procedure require more
than what was present in these cases. To accept the original
complaints as properly identifying Time as the defendant
would open wide the door to careless and inaccurate pleading. The burden of correct identification must be on the
plaintiff; the burden of overcoming misidentification should
not be on the defendant. We conclude that for a defendant
to be brought into a case, more than haphazard description of
the kind evidenced by these complaints as originally drawn is
necessary.
We do not regress to the unmourned days of meticulous
pleading, with every misstep fatal, when we so rule. Liberality in construing pleadings cannot be taken so far as to eviscerate basic requirements of fair judicial process. Fairness
to defendants demands some measure of accuracy greater
than that displayed here.
B

The complaints as they were amended, of course, meet the
identification standard. While the statement, "Fortune,
also known as Time, Incorporated, was and is a corporation
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of the state of New York," is not a model of accuracy, it does
focus on Time and sufficiently describes Time as the targeted
defendant. The next question, the.!:!J is ~hether tne amend- (
ment, made in July 1983, rel~j>_ac~ .~ ~e filjn~9,
a date concededly within the period of the applicable New
Jersey statute of limitations.
Central to the resolution of this issue is the language of
Rule 15(c). See n. 5, supra. ReJation b~ck is dependent
upon fo!,!r factors, all of which must be satisfied: (1) the basic
claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the
original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received such notice that 1t WI no be re udiced in maintaining i s e ense; (3) that party must or should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would
have been brought against it; and (4) the second and third requirements must have been fulfilled within the prescribed
limitations period. We are not concerned here with the first .
factor, but we are concerned with the satisfaction of the remaining three.
The first intimation that Time had of the institution and
maintenance of the three suits took place a!}gLMay 19, 1983,
the date the Court of Appeals said the statuteran "at the latest." 750 F. 2d, at 16. Only on May 20 did petitioners'
counsel mail the complaints to Time's registered agent in
New Jersey. Only on May 23 were those complaints received by the rei!stered gent, and ~sed. - Only on
July
1 each petitioner amend his complaint.
And only
on July 21 were the amended complaints served on Time.
It seems to us inevitably to follow that notice to Time and
the necessary knowledge did not come into being "within the
period provided by law for commencing the action against"
Time, as is so clearly required by Rule 15(c). That occurred
only after the expiration of the applicable 1-year period.
This is fatal, then, to petitioners' litigation.
We do not have before us a choice between a "liberal" approach toward Rule 15(c), on the one hand, and a "technical"
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interpretation of the Rule, on the other hand. The choice,
instead, is between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule
provides in plain language. We accept the Rule as meaning
what it says.
We are not inclined, either, to temper the plain meaning of
the language by engrafting upon it an extension of the limitations period equal to the asserted reasonable time, inferred
from Rule 4, for the service of a timely filed complaint. Rule
4 deals only with process. Rule 3 concerns the "commencement" of a civil action. Under Rule 15(c), the emphasis is
upon "the period provided by law for commencing the action
against" the defendant. An action is commenced by the filing of a complaint and, so far as Time is concerned, no complaint against it was filed on or prior to May 19, 1983.
Any possible doubt about this should have been dispelled
20 years ago by the Advisory Committee's 1966 Note about
Rule 15(c). The Note specifically states that the Rule's
phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing
the action" means "within the applicable limitations period":
"An amendment changing the party against whom a
claim is asserted relates back if the amendment satisfies
the usual condition of Rule 15(c) of'arising out ofthe conduct ... set forth ... in the original pleading,' and if,
within the applicable limitations period, the party
brought in by amendment, first, received such notice of
the institution of the action-the notice need not be formal-that he would not be prejudiced in defending the
action, and, second, knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against him initially had
there not been a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party" (emphasis supplied). Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15, 28 U. S. C.
App., p. 551; 39 F. R. D. 83.
Although the Advisory Committee's comments do not foreclose judicial consideration of the Rule's validity and meaning, the construction given by the Committee is "of weight."

'f
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Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438,
444 (1946).
The commentators have accepted the literal meaning of the
significant phrase in Rule 15(c) and have agreed with the Advisory Committee's Note. See 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice,
§ 15.15[4.-2], p. 15-225 (2nd ed. 1985) ("the Rule demands a
showing that, within the period of limitations, the new party
.... "); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1498, p. 228 (Supp. 1985) ("in order for an amendment
adding a party to relate back under Rule 15(c) the party to be
added must have received notice of the action before the statute of
s run").
The incQ.pin is notice and notice within the limitations period. Of course, t ere is an element of arbitrariness here,
but that is a characteristic of any limitations period. And it
is an arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the
judicial process. See Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 83,
85, n. 8 (1972). 8
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
8

Petitioners would garner support from Professor Clark Byse's article,
Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Proposals for Reform, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1963), cited in
the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 15, 28
U. S. C. App., p. 550; 39 F. R. D. 83. That study was critically directed
at four federal district court decisions concerning "relation back" in suits
against government officers. In each of the cases, however, the Government within the period of limitations was on notice of the claim.
Similarly, petitioners' reliance upon JUSTICE WHITE's footnote comment
in dissent from the denial of certiorari in Cooper v. United States Postal
Service, - - U. S. - - , - - , n. 2 (1985), seems to us to be misplaced.
JUSTICE WHITE, in fact, noted the inherent weakness of any such reliance
("Petitioners' position is somewhat weak in this regard because, while the
complaint was filed within the requisite 30 days, no party was served with
process within that period").
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CHAMISERS 01'"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 24, 1986

Re:

84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune,
aka Time, Incorporated

Dear Harry:
During the oral argument, counsel for Time,
Incorporated acknowledged that their legal position
would have been the same if the complaint ha{l
incorrectly named "Time, Inc." instead of using the
correct corporate name. Your opinion does not seem
to accept this formalistic view, but rather holds
that "fairness to defendants" requires something
"more than haphazard description of the kind
evidenced by these complaints as originally drawn."
Opinion at page 8.
At the end of your opinion you state that the
"linchpin is notice, and notice within the
limitations period." In the context of this case,
that sentence would be fully consistent with the
argument advanced by Time, because even a misspelling
would not put a defendant on notice within the
limitations period given the time sequence in this
case.
As you will recall, I voted the other way at
Conference and therefore expect to write in dissent.
I must confess, however, that I am not sure whether I
should be criticizing the majority for drawing a
hyper-technical distinction between "Time,
Incorporated" and "Time, Inc." or similar trivial
misnomers, on the one hand, or for adopting a
standard that is not explained because your opinion
provides no guidance whatsoever on the degree to
which a misdescription would be too haphazard to be
acceptable. If the standard really is "fairness to
the defendants," the opinion does not explain why
this complaint gave Time, Incorporated any less
notice that it was being sued than it would have
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given if it had simply misspelled the defendant's
name.
In all events, I shall be writing in dissent and
probably will criticize your draft both because it
seems to adopt the sporting theory of litigation that
Roscoe Pound criticized and also because it will
invite lots of litigation concerning your "more than
haphazard description" standard.
Respectfully,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

,ju.vuw
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ltf l4t ~ittb ~bdt.G'

Jlulfington.~. ~· 2ll,?'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 24, 1986

No. 84-1839

Schiavone v. Time, Inc.

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference

arourt &tf tlf~ ~nitta .Statts
JruJri:n:ghttt~ J. ar. 2llbi"-~

.hprmu
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

April 25

1986

Re: No. 84-1839, Schiavone v. Fortune
Dear John:
Thank you for your letter of April 24.
I anticipated your
dissent because your vote was that way and because your
questions from the bench during oral argument were in that
direction.
I think that you and those who are with you in this case
will agree that it would be impossible--and surely inadvisable-in one opinioil,.,.to cover every situation of careless pleading.
As a result, the proposed opinion attempts to decide this case
while leaving some elbowroom for others.
I thought that the
comments near the bottom of page 8 and at the top of page 9
pointed in this direction and were not mere proclamations. You,
of course, will disagree.
By all means, write as you wish, for
that, I suppose, is what this Court is all about.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

,jttptnnt Clf!tnrlltf tlrt ,-mt~ .jtaft.tr

JfaglfingUm. ~. C!J. 20~,.~
CHAMB E R S OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

April 25, 1986

84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune

Dear Harry,
I shall await the dissent.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

April 25, 1986

No. 84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

/
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CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE

w.. . J . BRENNAN , JR .

April 25, 1986

No. 84-1839
Schiavone, et al.
v. Fortune, a/k/a-TTme, Inc

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely,
/ 1

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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April 28, 1986

84-1839 Schiavone v. Fortune

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.,.'
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.iuprttttt <!Jltltri l1f tlrt ~tb .itatt•
jilt*Jrington. ~. <!J. 20~,.~
CHAMI!!IE:RS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 28, 1986
Re:

No. 84-1839

Schiavone v. Time, Inc.

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

J

.inpumt <!fO'ttrl O'f tlrt Jlnittb .jtates~Jringtlln. !l. <If. 21lbi~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 5, 1986

v
84-1839 - Schiavone v. Fortune

Dear John,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

/

ilnprtntt <!fami Df tlrt~b iltatt•
Jfuqinght~ ~.

<!f.

2tlgi'l~

CHAMI!II!:RS 01'"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 10, 1986
84-1839 - Ronald Schiavone, Genaro Liquori and
Joseph DiCarolis v. Fortune, aka Time, Inc.
Dear John:
I join your dissent.
Regards,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.;lnpumt QJomt gf tift ~b .jbdts

JhwJriughtn. ~. OJ. 21l.;T'l'
CHAMI!lE~S

O F"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 13, 1986

Re:

84-1839 - Schiavone, et al. v.
Fortune, aka Time

Dear Harry:
As I mentioned before Conference yesterday, I
enjoyed the first line of your golden shiner opinion
because it gives us a chance to laugh when we are
really too busy to think about what is happening with
our most pressing problem:>. I trust that you will
accept the following criticism in the spirit in which
it is offered.
In the opinion for the Court in this case, you
expressed bewilderment as to how a busy lawyer could
possibly misname the defendant in litigation of this
asserted magnitude. See p. 7. I have the same lack
of understanding as to how such a careful craftsman
as the author of the Court opinion in this case could
possibly have misnamed the party--you will note that
your caption names •Genaro Liquori" but the caption
to the papers that were actually filed name him as
"Genaro Liguori."
In order to
amendment to the
back to the time
might see fit to

forestall the need for a post-filing
caption that would have to relate
of announcement, I wonder if you
make an appropriate correction.

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
P.S.--It pains me to admit it, but I find that I
made the same mistake in my dissent.
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